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PURPOSE. The purpose of this study was to
investigate moral distress in Irish psychiatric
nurses.
DESIGN. A qualitative descriptive methodology
was used.
FINDINGS. The study conﬁrmed the presence of
moral distress and the situations that gave rise
to moral distress within psychiatric nurses
working in acute care settings.
PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS. The ﬁndings indicate
that while multidisciplinary teams appear to
function well on the surface, situations that give
rise to moral distress are not always
acknowledged or dealt with effectively.
Furthermore, unresolved moral conﬂict impacts
upon the quality of clinical decision-making by
not allowing open and transparent discussions
that allow clinicians the opportunity to address
their concerns adequately.
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Health service practitioners often ﬁnd themselves in
situations in which they feel ethically constrained and
like ineffective advocates for the patients they care for
(Erlen, 2001). This inability to translate moral choices
into moral action is described by some authors as
moral distress. Originally coined by Jameton (1984),
moral distress is the experience of individuals who are
morally constrained; they make moral judgements as
to the right course of action to take in a situation, but
because of restraining factors, either internal or exter-
nal, they ﬁnd they are unable to act.
Subsequent research on this phenomenon by
Corley, Elswick, Gorman, and Clor (2001), Fry, Harvey,
Hurley, and Foley (2002), Kelly (1998), and Wilkinson
(1987/8) suggested that initial distress occurs when an
individual feels restrained from acting morally, result-
ing in feelings of anger, frustration, and anxiety. Unre-
solved moral distress can develop into “reactive
distress,” which is characterized by feelings of power-
lessness, guilt, self-criticism, and low self-esteem.
Physiological responses such as crying, loss of sleep,
nightmares, and loss of appetite are also associated
with reactive distress. In the main, research in this area
concentrated on the dimensions and consequences of
moral distress. In particular, the focus was on situa-
tions that give rise to moral distress in critical care
environments such as triage nursing (Corley, 1995;
Corley et al., 2001; Wilkinson, 1987/8). An exception
includes Kelly’s (1998) study of graduate nurses, which
found that moral distress occurred when they felt prac-
titioners were not meeting their own expectations or
ideals of the nursing role.
Peter and Liaschenko (2004) argued that nurses, in
particular, feel vulnerable to moral conﬂict as a result
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of being ever present during client conﬂict/crisis as
compared with doctors and other allied disciplines
that have the option of stepping away from the imme-
diate consequences of their actions and decisions.
It is clear that the costs of unresolved moral distress
are high, with some practitioners feeling the need to
leave their posts in order to relieve the moral constraint
they feel (Corley et al., 2001). Other consequences may
culminate in nurses compromising their personal
integrity by trivializing the wrong doing or denying
any wrongdoing by suggesting that the problem is not
signiﬁcant or worthy of consideration. In addition,
individuals may compartmentalize their work roles by
distinguishing between their work personas and who
they see as their true selves. Ultimately, an individual
may abandon his/her principles altogether for reasons
of fear, expedience, or self-preservation, resulting in
the wounding of himself/herself in a way that is life
changing (Rushton, 2006; Webster & Baylis, 2000).
The experience of moral distress is further com-
pounded when practitioners perceive managers and
administrators as not being adequately receptive or
supportive during morally challenging situations (Hef-
ferman & Heilig, 1999). Challenging questionable deci-
sions, for many practitioners, is seen as a professionally
risky strategy that could lead to punitive action, and
consequently many practitioners kept their own
counsel (Redman & Fry, 2000; Sundin-Huard & Fahy,
1999).
It would be a mistake, however, to think that all
theorists consider moral distress to be a wholly nega-
tive experience. Hanna (2002, 2004) and others
(Lützen, Cronquist, Magnusson, & Anderson, 2003)
have argued that moral distress has been inaccurately
linked only to the negative psychological and emo-
tional impact of morally challenging situations. Alter-
natively, Benner (1991), Peter and Liaschenko (2004),
Rushton (1992), and Hardingham (2004) suggested
that some nurses ﬁnd the experience of moral distress
to be a positive catalyst for change and an experience
through which nurses pass in order to understand
their own moral values and their professional
obligations with regard to standards of care and moral
commitments.
The concept of moral distress, therefore, should be
viewed as an umbrella concept that captures a range of
experiences that an individual may experience when
morally constrained (McCarthy & Deady, 2008). These
constraints may be individual, institutional, or societal
(Kopala & Burkhart, 2006).
Moral Distress and Psychiatric/Mental
Health Nursing
While the performance of moral practice is an
integral aspect of professional psychiatric nursing
(Denieffe, Wells, & Denny, 2008), the main focus of
situations that give rise to moral constraint has been
within medical nursing environments such as critical
care and acute care settings. Consequently, we found
few studies investigating the prevalence, or otherwise,
of moral distress among psychiatric nurses. Notable
exceptions are Austin, Bergum, and Golberg (2003)
and Austin, Rankel, Kagan, Bergum, and Lemermeyer
(2005), who considered the experiences of psychiatric
nurses, physicians, psychologists, social workers, and
nonprofessional carers. Both of these studies noted that
members of the multidisciplinary team did not always
agree on the situations that gave rise to moral distress,
while the nurse perspectives focused in the main on
continuing care issues such as staff resources and
quality of care.
Although there is limited research on moral dis-
tress in psychiatric nursing, research has identiﬁed a
number of situations that can cause concerns for
psychiatric nurses. These include the practices of
restraining patients, forced medication, and coercion
(Fish & Culshaw, 2005; Lakeman, 2003; Olofsson &
Norberg, 2000; Olsen, 2003). While Olsen contends
that the use of coercion by nurses can result in “moral
discomfort” for the nurse who is torn between her/
his professional obligations in law and her/his belief
and commitment to the therapeutic beneﬁt of
nursing, Lind, Kaltiala-Heino, Suominen, Leino-Kilpi,
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and Välimäki (2004) found that not all nurses per-
ceived coercive measures as ethically problematic.
The rationale as to why nurses adopt different moral
perspectives and do not subsequently experience
moral concern in the same way, for the same situation,
is not clear; although Barker (2003, p. 512) suggested
“moral complacency” as a mechanism for why moral
concerns may not be addressed. More recent com-
mentary (Fennell, Williamson, & Yeats, 2009) high-
lights the increase in policy and legal frameworks to
protect patient rights as further sources of additional
ethical challenges for practitioners.
Research Design
Part of the rationale for this study originated
during a psychiatric research group discussion when
one of the members began discussing the phenom-
enon of moral distress. The description gave rise to a
discussion of familiar behavior in a previous study
conducted by one of the authors (Deady, 2005) where
Irish psychiatric nurses had shared their lived expe-
riences. The incidents reﬂected some of the contextual
elements of Austin and colleagues’ (2003; 2005) ﬁnd-
ings and so suggested that moral distress may exist in
this group. Furthermore, in light of the limited
research on moral distress within psychiatric nursing,
we felt that an investigation would be a useful
addition to the debate and further delineate the
nature of the phenomenon and the situations that
give rise to it.
Methodology
The aim of the study was to explore psychiatric
nurses’ experiences of moral distress within acute care
settings. The objectives of the study were (a) to explore
the presence of moral distress among psychiatric
nurses, (b) to identify the situations that gave rise to
moral distress among psychiatric nurses in acute care
settings, (c) to describe the features of moral distress
experienced by psychiatric nurses working within an
acute care setting, and (d) to describe ways in which
psychiatric nurses cope with the experience of moral
distress.
In order to achieve this, we carried out a qualitative
descriptive investigation. We chose a qualitative
descriptive approach as it was our intention to solely
describe the features of moral distress as they were
experienced by psychiatric nurses. This was particu-
larly important as the literature search had not speciﬁ-
cally identiﬁed moral distress within the ﬁeld of
mental health nursing in any substantive way.
Sampling
As previous studies in moral distress were largely
focused in acute care settings within general nursing,
we decided to focus this initial study within the
equivalent acute care settings of the mental health ser-
vices. Following ethical approval from the Clinical
Research Ethics Committee of the teaching hospitals
in the region, advertisements and invitations were
circulated seeking a purposive sample of candidates
who had had experiences they believed constituted
moral distress as deﬁned by Jameton (1984). The term
“moral distress” was part of the explanatory text
required by the Ethics Committee for participant
consent. Although explicitly identifying the phenom-
enon under study may be considered to be introduc-
ing bias, our intention was not to develop theory
about the phenomenon but to conﬁrm incidences
of it and to describe these incidences speciﬁcally.
Nine registered psychiatric nurses (ﬁve males
and four females) contacted the researchers and
agreed to participate in the study; these were divided
between the researchers for interview. One female
participant subsequently withdrew, leaving eight
participants.
Data Collection
A semi-structured interview was used by means of
open-ended questions and prompts to expand expla-
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nations. Following a reading of the consent form,
which included an explanation of the phenomenon of
moral distress, participants were asked whether they
had had such an experience (knowing what the right
thing to do was, but being unable to act), and if so, to
describe the situation. Participants were also asked
how they had felt during the episode and what they
had been thinking at the time. Finally, they were
asked how they had coped with the experience and
to identify any obstacles that may have prevented
them from acting otherwise. This method has been
described by Pope and Mays (2000) as depth
interviewing; a technique that allows two or three
areas to be studied in depth and facilitates the
discovery of new areas or ideas not anticipated at the
outset of the research. No judgement was communi-
cated by the researcher as to whether the participant’s
narrative constituted moral distress during the
interview.
If not discussed by participants, issues that were
identiﬁed in the literature, such as involvement in
restraint or forced medication, were introduced for
consideration by the participants. In addition, sequen-
tial analysis (Pope & Mays, 2000) took place as inter-
views were concluded and discussions took place
between the researchers as to the themes that were
emerging, and these informed the scope and focus of
subsequent interviews. For example, the issue of
suicide following discharge had not emerged as an
area of moral concern for nurses in the literature; when
this was identiﬁed by one participant as an area of
concern, it became a potential issue for discussion at
subsequent interviews.
At this point, the researchers discussed the incidents
described by the participants and made judgements as
to their validity in terms of meeting Corley and col-
leagues’ study (2001), and those of Fry et al. (2002),
Jameton (1984), Kelly et al. (1998), Wilkinson (1987/8),
and criteria for moral distress. The interviews were
taped (approximately 1 hr) and then transcribed verba-
tim, and their validity was authenticated by returning
them to the interviewees.
Data Analysis
Pope and Mays’ (2000) discussion on analyzing
qualitative data was used to guide the analysis process.
Through the transcription process and multiple read-
ings of the transcripts, signiﬁcant phrases or state-
ments were initially identiﬁed independently by the
two researchers from each of the interviews. The fact
that the researchers originated from different profes-
sional backgrounds (philosophy and psychiatric
nursing) added value to the independent analysis. This
strategy allowed the researchers to test whether inter-
pretations of the data were shared (e.g., whether both
researchers agreed on what the data were saying).
Statements were initially considered to be signiﬁcant
if they met Corley and colleagues’ (2001), Fry and
colleagues’ (2002), Jameton’s (1984), Kelly’s (1998),
Wilkinson’s (1987/8), and criteria for moral distress
and were related to the research aims and objectives.
The identiﬁed statements were then assessed as to their
representational validity by an external researcher with
expertise in psychiatric nursing. Following this, the
statements were further discussed by the researchers
in terms of the core issues participants were
discussing.
The themes that emerged from the analysis are pre-
sented under the research objectives and include (a)
the presence of moral distress, (b) the situations that
gave rise to moral distress, (c) the features of moral
distress, and (d) coping with the experience of moral
distress.
Findings
Moral Distress in Psychiatric Nurses
The study conﬁrmed the presence of moral distress
within psychiatric nursing in terms of the criteria out-
lined by Corley and colleagues (2001), Fry and col-
leagues (2002), Jameton (1984), Kelly (1998), and
Wilkinson (1987/8). Participants reported moral con-
straint as originating from both internal and external
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sources. In addition, both initial and reactive responses
to moral distress were reported. The following content
is reﬂective of the narratives in terms of their emphasis
within the interviews (i.e., participants spoke at a
greater length with regard to the situations that gave
rise to moral distress, with less emphasis on their spe-
ciﬁc feelings and coping strategies).
Situations That Gave Rise to Moral Distress
The situations that gave rise to moral distress expe-
rienced by participants can be clustered into three
themes: (a) professional and legal conﬂict; (b) profes-
sional autonomy and scope of practice; and (c) stan-
dards of care and client autonomy.
Professional and Legal Conﬂict
Some participants reported that conﬂict relating to
professional judgement or clinical decision-making
within multidisciplinary teams led to moral distress.
Doctors and some allied professions were viewed as
having greater power over clinical decision-making,
either because of their status within mental health law
or perceived status within the professions. Further-
more, participants believed that, on occasion, their
observations, such as illness deterioration or perceived
client vulnerability, were not given equal weighting or
signiﬁcance, despite the fact that they spent greater
time with clients. This situation gained greater signiﬁ-
cance, in terms of the impact upon the participant if
clients did subsequently act out their vulnerability (i.e.,
attempted suicide following discharge) or the client’s
mental health deteriorated further. In addition, partici-
pants were further frustrated with the limitation or
absence of postincident discussions by the team, which
left participants feeling that the incident and their asso-
ciated moral concerns were unresolved. In the words
of two participants,
The consultant carried on, because he is in charge. So
I think it is one of those things that, what could you
have done? Other than getting hold of the consult-
ant and saying don’t let this man go yet, there’s
something else that we need to do. There were no
papers, he had no family as I can remember, and
nothing happened. Coroner’s inquest ﬁne, that’s the
legal thing over in the community, but in the hospi-
tal nothing happened. (R2)
I said surely be to God if someone went off and
committed suicide like that, if a nurse had said to a
doctor she should be admitted, that should be neg-
ligence, and she (a solicitor) said that it wasn’t, that
was a medical decision. (R3)
In summary, participants experienced moral dis-
tress when they had difﬁculty sharing their profes-
sional views on clinical decisions they disagreed with.
In particular, this situation became more difﬁcult when
they believed colleagues did not value their views or
senior colleagues would not act upon their concerns.
This occurred when they believed that professional
conﬂict and/or potential legal issues superseded the
need to address the client’s needs.
Professional Autonomy and Scope of Practice
All participants indicated they were comfortable
with the practices of restraint, forced medication,
seclusion, or electroconvulsive therapy, if they per-
ceived them as being prescribed by medical staff, legal,
and applied appropriately. Moral distress was experi-
enced, however, when participants believed that they
had to use coercive practices with clients because
medical interventions were insufﬁcient, late in being
prescribed, or prescribed for nonmedical reasons. Par-
ticipants believed that multidisciplinary team
members outside of nursing were in a position to
absent themselves from the clinical arena and the
immediate ongoing client care. This often left the nurse
as a mere observer of the client’s deteriorating mental
health status. This situation became more signiﬁcant
when participants believed that delayed medical inter-
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ventions meant that they were left to deal with unnec-
essary and unwarranted levels of conﬂict with clients
as a result.
The doctor that met with the patient was only admit-
ting her as a crisis intervention at the time and felt
that there was no need for an admission, but it was
so late at night she couldn’t send her home. But
about two hours later the patient became very
erratic and disturbed. That was the problem we ran
into then. The consultant on call refused to come in
and review the patient and the Junior Doctor’s atti-
tude was “Right, I’ll prescribe it (IM medication) but
you give it.” (J1)
The duty doctor was refusing to do anything
because he wasn’t going to go over the consult-
ant . . . We were kind of left to pick up the pieces
really. (R5)
Some participants also experienced moral distress
when they believed clinical decisions were imposing
inappropriate restrictions on a clients’ behavior that
related to issues of lifestyle rather than issues to do
with client safety or their mental health status.
It was a lady who lived on her own for years and had
a very nice life, functioned away . . . how she lived
and her standard of living was ﬁne, but for the team
itwas considered bad andpoor, and itwouldn’t have
been up to the standard of us working here, and I
guess coming from a country place and meeting
people who live in the country, people have different
standards of living, and I felt that it wasn’t our place
to impose our standards on her, and what was being
done, really,was that shewas beingheld as a prisoner
until she conformed to our standards, which I
thought actually was really wrong. (R3)
In summary, participants believed that unique
insights gained from extended contact with clients
were either undervalued or the participant’s profes-
sional autonomy was reduced to that of a warden of
client care while clinical decisions were made by other
disciplines.
Standards of Care and Client Autonomy
Some participants reported that challenging a peer’s
standard of practice was a potentially distressing situ-
ation. Although participants would not tolerate illegal
practices, there was a perceived need to get on with
fellow colleagues even if their practice was viewed as
poor. When they did concede to a colleague’s lower
standard of practice, it left them feeling morally
conﬂicted.
What stops me from acting was I am part of a team,
which should be cohesive, but if I intervene in these
situations I’m interfering with primary nursing, and
I think I would be seen as splitting the team by
taking the side of the patient. I think it would,
because it was the practice that the majority of the
staff use. (R4)
Some participants reported that they found it difﬁ-
cult to challenge a colleague’s clinical judgement as
they believed it could result in being isolated within
the group. This isolation would often be subtle, such as
indirectly questioning the participant’s level of compe-
tence or withdrawing support at key moments leaving
them isolated.
A colleague who had had the same experience and
who saw me being blamed, if you hadn’t said this, if
you hadn’t said that, she wouldn’t have done it.
They were kind of blaming our observation . . . In
fact we found it was extremely difﬁcult to try and
report incidences, that people were inclined to say,
“Look, leave well alone.” (R4)
In addition, all the participants reported experienc-
ing moral distress as a result of the standard of care
being offered by the service as a whole. Participants felt
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they were under-resourced and that despite evidence
for the efﬁcacy of alternative treatments, clients and
families were rarely offered choices as to the treat-
ments or services they could access. As a result, medi-
cation became the most widely used form of treatment.
It’s the emotional feelings you have. The moral dis-
tress arises because the clients aren’t getting a good
quality service and that can lead to moral distress
for me. So, how can I treat myself and how can a
client who has his own moral distress, how can a
chemical treat that kind of moral distress? (R4)
Situations where a client’s level of autonomy was, in
the participant’s view, restricted were also seen to give
rise to moral distress. According to one participant, a
client, who was suffering from a progressive terminal
illness, was prevented from discharge because he/she
had indicated a wish to seek euthanasia abroad (illegal
in Ireland). The participant felt that this action was
being inappropriately interpreted as an expression of
suicidal intent by the doctor and that the client should
be allowed to make his/her own end-of-life decisions,
rather than being incarcerated at this emotional time.
I suppose when I thought of myself in that situation
(slow and progressive terminal illness) I would
rather be dead, and clearly she would rather be
dead, and then again it comes back to like quality of
life and like is it just a life or is it quality of life, is it
existing or is it enough to just exist, or should you
have some quality, which is more important? (R3)
In sum, participants experienced moral distress
when they perceived the standard of care being offered
fell below their own personal and professional criteria
for best practice. Participants suggested that the inabil-
ity of nurses to inﬂuence the decision-making of the
mental health service system, at a personal, clinical, or
organizational level, was a contributory factor. Finally,
client self-determination was a principle that they
viewed as important; however, practicing this was
problematic when personal and professional beliefs
clashed with colleagues’ views and the law.
Features of Moral Distress Experienced by Nurses
The features reported as a result of moral distress
were wide ranging and inﬂuenced both personal and
professional aspects of the participant’s life. Feelings of
self-doubt, guilt, frustration, anger, and depression
were common features; these comments are represen-
tative of the participants’ views. “Sometimes you
wonder did you do your best” (J3). “You always
wonder what you could have done differently, or you
wonder sometimes is it yourself or is it the service?”
(R1). “I was very annoyed and angry over the situation
and disempowered” (R3). “I suppose I vented my
anger more so on management; they were so lax, and
the consultant was so lax about it, and she had done it
before” (J1). “So reﬂecting back on the whole thing, I
went home on three nights quite distressed” (R4).
Initial feelings of unease and anger were common,
particularly when there was a lack of opportunity to
discuss or resolve moral conﬂicts or concerns. For
example, one participant’s experience of moral distress
centered on hearing one of his own clients, who he
believed was placed inappropriately in an acute unit,
shouting. The shouting could be heard from a car park
by members of the public. He felt embarrassed and
disheartened that this was the image the public would
have of the discipline and that there was little he could
do to resolve the situation.
We talk about trying to get rid of the stigma of
mental illness . . . where you get out of your car in a
general hospital to visit someone who has had their
appendix out or whatever and they hear this patient
shouting, and they say “What the hell is that?” And
of course they say, “That’s the psychiatric unit; oh
yes it’s typical of a psychiatric unit.” I am trying
then to give a good impression, to try and do my
job, and try and present to families who come to us
for a service, you know in the situation. (R1)
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Another participant questioned the motives of the
service provision by likening it to a visit he had made
to a concentration camp museum:
I look at my service where I work, ok it’s not a
fair comparison, but are we doing the same
thing. . . . Are you just trying to control people? You
are not giving people responsibility or choices. (J3)
Many of the narratives of the participants indicated
that these feelings continued to upset them for long
periods (in many cases years), resulting in reactive
responses. These features were equally wide ranging
and included feelings of depression, burnout, and
guilt, as well as feelings of being overwhelmed and let
down by the system, stigmatized by the media and
public, and feelings of disempowerment. “I would be
very angry about that; I would still be annoyed, yes”
(R3). “It was the worst incident I have experienced in 5
years and that incident glows in my mind” (R4).
I’d be reasonably good to leave my work at work,
reasonably good. Now obviously we’re all the same,
there are times you wake up in the morning, maybe
half an hour before the alarm clock goes off, you
think this thing now is just too much. (R1)
On the other hand, some participants reported hard-
ening or resolving themselves to the situation, in the
words of two participants:
Well, after 25 years you kind of lose that initial “My
god, that’s terrible.” I mean if you want to evaluate
by your own standards how you should react in a
situation, well if it was my brother or my mother,
my father, how would I feel if they were left out of
hospital to sort of resume a life of poverty, depriva-
tion, or distress. . . . Then, that’s sort of the space in
your head that you occupy or you evaluate by that
standard, that inner template, so, at work you can’t
afford to indulge in that because you certainly
wouldn’t get your work done. (J2)
The consultant was the person who made the deci-
sion, which I didn’t think was the right thing, but
then as a staff nurse, I could have refused and not
given the medication, but then someone else would
have given it. (R3)
In sum, while the participants demonstrated a wide
range of emotions that occurred when they found
themselves challenged, such as anger and guilt, one of
the main features of these experiences were that they
endured over long periods of time.Although they used
many strategies to cope with the experience, these
appeared to be limited in terms of extinguishing the
memory and associated feelings. In some cases, this led
to ongoing trauma and experiences of depression. It is
not surprising then to ﬁnd that all participants devel-
oped a range of strategies to immunize themselves
from ongoing moral distress.
Coping Strategies
The strategy of immunizing oneself to the moral
conﬂict was a common tactic. It took a variety of guises
such as avoiding the conﬂict by adapting/acquiescing
to the cultural pressure (going along), denying or trivi-
alizing the problem (turn a blind eye, rationalize),
refusing to participate or work with a particular col-
league, or move job or adopt a dual moral code of
behavior: one for home and one for work. “I’d be
upbeat about these things, I see some of my colleagues
just wouldn’t take it, they’d ﬁnd it extremely difﬁcult
and they constantly go on about it” (R1). “So I suppose
what ultimately happened really was that I did my best
to be moved from that place, so I moved myself from
the environment” (R3). “You go with the ﬂow. . . . Chill
out and do your own thing. You can’t protect everyone
all the time” (J1). “You’re bearing witness to it and its
unfortunate you’re bearing witness to it, but that’s life”
(J2).
For many participants, compartmentalizing the
problem appeared to be a necessary strategy in order
to get on with their everyday work and life. In some
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cases, there was evidence of coping mechanisms such
as intellectualizing the problem or distancing oneself
from the problem.
I suppose you become aware of what’s possible and
you become aware of what you can do, and more
important, you become aware of what you can’t
do. . . . You don’t ever actually accept it, which is
kind of odd, I hadn’t thought of that before. (J2)
Well you have to lock away your emotions, you
could actually put your self down, and when you
are dealing with people who are distressed, have
problems, have loads of emotional psychological
problems, you can’t be walking around and saying
I’ve loads of problems myself, you’re telling me
your problems, I know all about it I’ve the same
thing myself, that’s a lot of help to you isn’t it? (R1)
Other more proactive coping strategies included
reﬂecting on the problem personally, with family,
peers, managers, supervisors, or counsellors. Other
coping strategies included taking courses to gain
further education or training, acting professionally,
reassuring patients, empathizing with patients, and
choosing to challenge moral concerns when it was per-
ceived safe to do so. Ultimately, discussing moral con-
cerns was not always seen as an option as this strategy
was perceived either as threatening to the participant
or jeopardizing team cohesiveness.
I thought at the time, said, should I do more about
this, this can’t be right, compared with what’s
going on, so I just thought about it . . . and I spoke
to I suppose a few close friends, colleagues about
it, and the advice I got was, that if I had taken it
further, that my life as a nurse working wouldn’t
have been worth it, it would have been made very
difﬁcult, and people in the past who had made
comments . . . were outcast, so I thought an awful
lot about it . . . but I didn’t do anything about that.
(R3)
I would make it very diplomatically. I wouldn’t
force it. In as much that to force issues in a multidis-
ciplinary situation you’re disturbing the balance
and the other thing is there is a breakdown in the
process, a breakdown in the relationship, so you
have to balance the thing. You have to be very dip-
lomatic in putting forward these things, and that’s
another part, a contributory factor to my moral dis-
tress. (R1)
In addition, participants often believed that they
had little or no power (e.g., low grade, inexperience,
low discipline status) to challenge some senior nursing
colleagues or medical staff. In particular, junior staff
believed their moral concerns were not adequately
addressed within multidisciplinary and nursing hier-
archies. “Looking back it’s you in the staff nurse posi-
tion, not enough experience I suppose to say you can
use the system” (R2).
In sum, participants either used avoidance strategies
that they hoped would intellectually immunize them
from the distress they felt or pursued strategies they
hoped would allow them to physically distance them-
selves from the source of the problem. To acknowledge
any problems was seen as inappropriate when
working with vulnerable clients, and addressing any
moral distress seemed impossible in the current
climate. As a result, participants were more inclined to
use personal and/or informal mechanisms of support
such as talking with peers, friends, and family in order
to cope.
Discussion
The ﬁndings of the study were generally consistent
with those of other research into moral distress, with
some interesting exceptions. Participants conﬁrmed
the existence of features reﬂecting both initial and reac-
tive distress in response to moral distress as reported
elsewhere (Corley et al., 2001; Fry et al., 2002, Kelly,
1998; Wilkinson, 1987/8). Features of initial distress
included anger, anxiety, and frustration, and features
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of reactive distress included feelings of powerlessness,
guilt, self-criticism, and low self-esteem.A typical reac-
tive response following long-term frustration was the
“parking lot” incident reported earlier, which was
similar to an incident reported in Austin et al.’s (2003)
study in Canada, suggesting that frustration with
mental health service provision is not a phenomenon
unique to Ireland.
As with Hefferman and Heilig’s (1999) study, the
participants felt that the current healthcare system
was not adequately receptive or supportive during
morally challenging situations. Hierarchical manage-
ment practices that led to the custom of “doctor
knows best” frustrated many participants’ efforts to
assert their clinical expertise. This is reﬂective of
Redman and Fry’s (2000) and Sundin-Huard & Fahy’s
(1999) studies that reported that nurses believed their
clinical insights were being undervalued. This percep-
tion left participants feeling unsupported, the conse-
quence of which, as with Kelly’s (1996, 1998, p. 1138)
studies, was to acquiesce to the decisions made by
multidisciplinary teams or the individual senior
members (e.g., doctors, senior nurse managers) in an
effort to “ﬁt in.” The need to ﬁt in was a strong
driving force for many participants as the conse-
quences of not doing so resulted in professional iso-
lation and further frustration. This belief often led to
participants’ disinclination to challenge multidisci-
plinary team decisions and inclination to keep their
own counsel.
The study also supports Peter and Liaschenko’s
(2004) ﬁnding that nurses feel more vulnerable to
moral conﬂict as a result of being ever present during
client conﬂict/crisis. The participants believed that
doctors and other disciplines had the option of step-
ping away from the immediate consequences of their
actions and clinical decisions. This often left the par-
ticipants feeling vulnerable to unwarranted risks that
were not of their making and made them feel they had
been abandoned by other team members who had the
tools or power to deal with the crisis in a professional
and timely manner.
Finally, the coping strategies employed by the
nurses mirrored those reported in other studies
(Jameton, 1984; Webster & Baylis, 2000). However, for a
coping strategy to be successful, a resolution needs to
be arrived at that adequately addresses the partici-
pant’s personal and/or professional care philosophy. It
is interesting to note that participants struggled to
highlight more than a small number of incidents that
ﬁtted the moral distress criteria, despite having the
opportunity to share as many as they wanted. Why this
is the case is unclear, but it does appear to suggest that
incidences of moral distress have an enduring nature in
the participants’ psyches. While for some participants
this experience has resulted in negative consequences,
it is clear that some participants have used their expe-
riences as catalysts for change (Benner, 1991; Harding-
ham, 2004; Peter & Liaschenko, 2004; Rushton, 1992).
Nevertheless, a recommendation that nurses should
seek support or challenge morally distressing situa-
tions with colleagues (Hanna, 2005; Kälvemark,
Höglund, Hansson, Westerholm, & Arntz, 2004;
Meaney, 2002) appears problematic for the participants
in this study because they reported feeling threatened
and vulnerable. Accordingly, the assertion by Kälve-
mark et al. (2004) and Austin et al. (2005) that there is
dissatisfaction with the level of discussion of ethical
challenges within disciplines employing multidisci-
plinary models is supported by our study.
Implications for Nursing Practice
The ﬁndings indicate that while multidisciplinary
teams appear to function well on the surface, situations
that give rise to moral distress are not always acknowl-
edged or dealt with effectively. Furthermore, in the
absence of open and transparent discussions that allow
clinicians the opportunity to address their concerns
adequately, unresolved moral conﬂict can impact on
the quality of clinical decision-making. This, in turn,
may also impact on the quality of care that clients ulti-
mately receive. Moreover, the experiences of moral dis-
tress reported indicate that nurses can ultimately feel
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morally damaged and, as a result, may respond by
using strategies that do not necessarily enhance their
personal and professional development or the quality
of service provision.
While the current Irish policy document A Vision for
Change (2006) cites multidisciplinary teamwork as key
to the functioning of the service, this study indicates
that there are difﬁculties with current multidisci-
plinary practices when morally challenging situations
arise. Currently, within the Irish mental health services
there is an absence of formal guidelines to direct the
practices of multidisciplinary teams. As a result,
decision-making frameworks have developed in an ad
hoc manner; some teams foster mutual respect and
encourage the sharing of moral concerns while others
undermine and inhibit participation. Consequently,
individuals ﬁnd they require moral courage in order to
act on their convictions. Miller (2005), in her critique of
moral courage, argues that it is not an innate charac-
teristic and so requires education and habituation, and
for this to be successful, role models are needed to
guide practice. However, this study has identiﬁed that
role models are not always in evidence, and as a result,
individuals often fear the consequences of acting alone.
Therefore, a need exists for multidisciplinary programs
that allow interdisciplinary discussions of common
moral concerns in practice and agreement on protocols
that achieve mutual goals.
Finally, future research will need to focus on a more
complete explanation of the complex social processes
that operate within multidisciplinary teams. Such an
explanation will allow a greater understanding of the
sociocultural and psychological mechanisms that
create the conditions for the prevalence of moral dis-
tress. In addition, it may also point toward strategies to
enhance the ability of nurses and other professionals to
resolve moral distress in ways that make their own
professional lives more bearable and, in turn, improve
the quality of care that they provide.
Author contact: r.deady@ucc.ie, with a copy to the Editor:
gpearson@uchc.edu
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